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IN THE SHADOWS:
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AGREEMENTS
AND THE EFFECT THEIR NONDISCLOSURE
HAS ON CIVIL TRIALS
JEFFREY JAMES GROSHOLZ*
ABSTRACT

Third-party litigationfunding ("TPLF") has become an increasingly
common practice in the United States in recent years, especially in the
field of civil litigation. In civil practice, TPLF entails a third party
funding the litigation costs of an actual party to a case and in turn the
third party receives a share of any damages if the suit is successful.
Often, the court andjury are not aware of any TPLFagreement, as there
are currently few rules requiring disclosure of the existence of such
agreements or the identity of TPLF financiers. And while generally
entities engaged in TPLF have no connection to the parties, in at least
one high-profile case the third party financing the litigation had a
personal animus against the defendants. Further, there is evidence
suggesting the plaintiff's litigation strategy in that case was driven by
this animus between the third party and the defendants and had an
effect on the overall outcome of the lawsuit.
This trend raises numerous concerns, namely whether TPLF
arrangements should be allowed to take place in the shadows while
courts and juries are none the wiser. Opponents of the practice as
it currently stands argue TPLF agreements should be disclosed in
the name of fairness to the parties and in the spirit of transparency.
Proponents of the status quo, on the other hand, argue TPLF
allows individuals who would otherwise not be able to afford the high
cost of litigation to vindicate their rights and that disclosure of these
agreements will have impropereffects on jury verdicts. As of early 2020,
Wisconsin and West Virginia are the only states with laws requiring
disclosure of TPLF agreements; however, there are currently proposals
in the United States Senate and in many states that would enshrine
rules requiring TPLF disclosure. Similar proposals have also been
made before the FederalAdvisory Committee on Civil Rules of Practice
and Procedure.
This Note argues for the adoption of these proposed rules
requiring disclosure of TPLF agreements. It will approach this from
the perspective of third partiesfunding the litigation costs of plaintiffs
(as opposed to funding defense cases). This Note will also show
that mandatory TPLF disclosure aligns more closely with the notions
* Law Clerk to the Honorable James A. Edwards of Florida's Fifth District Court of
Appeal. 2019 graduate of the Florida State University College of Law. Special thanks to my
wife Eleanor Sills, and Professors Justin T. Sevier and Sarah L. Swan.
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of fairness that underline the main tenets of the American civil system.
And because disclosure should have no effect on the substantive facts
and laws at issue in a dispute, it should thus not impact verdicts. It
could, however, play a role in calculatingpotentialpunitive damages,
namely in cases where the TPLF is motivated by personal animus
against one of the parties. Finally, this Note will rebut arguments
against mandatory disclosure by showing that any concerns regarding
the adoptionof such rules are outweighed by fundamental concerns for
fairness and transparency.
I.
II.

INTRODU CTION .....................................................................
BRIEF HISTORY OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING....................................

483

III.
IV.

THE GAWKER CASE ..............................................................
SURVEY OF EXISTING RULES AND PROPOSALS FOR
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING....................................

488

A. FederalRules.................................................................
B. State Rules.....................................................................

492
493

C. ProposedRules ..............................................................

494

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ADOPTING RULES
REQUIRING THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING
D ISCLOSU R E .........................................................................

494

V.

Third-PartyLitigation FundingDisclosure
Creates a FairerPlayingField .....................................
B. Third-PartyLitigation FundingDisclosure
Could PotentiallyAffect Punitive Damages
Calculations..................................................................

485

492

A.

495

496

VI.

REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADOPTING
RULES REQUIRING THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION
FUNDING DISCLOSURE .........................................................

498

VII.

C ON CLU SION ........................................................................

499

IN THE SHADOWS

2020]

483

I. INTRODUCTION
"Parties in civil matters have the right to a fair,
accurate and timely jury trial in accordance with law."1
In June 2016, Gawker Media ("Gawker")-an online news media
company-filed for bankruptcy. 2 This was due to a $140 million
judgment leveled against it by a Florida jury in an invasion-of-privacy
suit brought by Terry Bollea ("Bollea"), better known as the wrestler
Hulk Hogan. 3 It was only after the trial ended that the role Peter Thiel
("Thiel"), a Silicon Valley investor and billionaire, played in the case
was discovered. 4 Despite not being an actual party to the suit, Thiel
had in fact been deeply involved in the litigation.5 Thiel invested
roughly $10 million of his own money into Bollea's lawsuit, all in
6
service of his ultimate goal: to drive Gawker out of business. Thiel's
involvement was a rare example of the practice known as third-party
litigation funding ("TPLF") being publicly discovered.
TPLF is a common civil litigation practice whereby a third party
not connected to a case funds the litigation costs of an actual party to
the case in return for a negotiated percentage of any awarded damages
should the suit be successful. 7 The modern practice of TPLF emerged

1. PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS princ. 1.A at 3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2005)
(emphasis added), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/american_

jury/principles.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3PX-DU2K]; see also Jacob v. City of
New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752 (1942) ("The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is
a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected
by the Seventh Amendment.").

2. Sydney Ember, Gawker, Filing for Bankruptcy After Hulk Hogan Suit, is for Sale,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2016), https://nytimes.com/2016/06/11/business/media/gawker-bankruptcy-sale.html [https://perma.cc/B8NQ-ALU8].
3. Id.; see also Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 522012CA012447, 2016 WL 4073660,
at *1-2 (Fla. Pinellas County Ct. June 8, 2016) (court's order of final judgment against Defendants Gawker Media, Nick Denton, and Albert Daulerio).
4. Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, This Silicon Valley Billionaire Has Been Secretly
Funding Hulk Hogan's Lawsuits Against Gawker, FORBES (May 24, 2016), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2016/05/24/this-silicon-valley-billionaire-has-been-secretly-funding-hulk-hogans-lawsuits-against-gawker/#36af967b8d14./ [https://perma.cc/VP5G-A53J].
5. Id.
6. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech Billionaire,Reveals Secret War with Gawker,
N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/business/dealbook/peterthiel-tech-billionaire-reveals-secret-war-with-gawker.html [https://perma.cc/3WGH-BX57].
7. Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-PartyLitigation Funding Regulation, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 863 (2015); see also Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and
Economic Approach to Third-PartyLitigation Funding, 19 CARDOZo J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343,
350-51 (2011) (defining TPLF in more detail as "the specific practice in which a third party
offers financial support to a claimant in order to cover his litigation expenses, in return for

a share of damages if the claim is successful, or nothing if the case is lost, ensuring the
financier a passive role who assumes no control over the litigation").
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in the United States in the mid-1990s,8 and was originally focused
on individual plaintiffs who could not otherwise afford the costs of
litigation.9 Notwithstanding this, TPLF has become a mainstay in the
American civil trial system while also growing into a billion-dollar
industry.10 And yet, it remains severely under-regulated."
This lack of regulation raises questions about the fairness of
lawsuits that involve TPLF. This Note focuses on current and proposed
rules to regulate TPLF, at both the state and federal level,12 and
recommends for the adoption of these rules.1 3 There are currently no
federal rules requiring mandatory disclosure of TPLF agreements. 4
Only a handful of states have legislation even regulating the practice, 5
and as of early 2020 Wisconsin and West Virginia are the only states
with laws requiring disclosure of TPLF agreements.1 6 Senators in the
116th Congress in February 2019 filed a bill that would "increase
transparency and oversight of [TPLF] in certain actions[.]"" There
was also a proposal before the 2019 Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
of Practice and Procedure asking it to amend Rule 26(a)(1)(A) to
require greater TPLF disclosure. 18 This Note argues the lack of
8. Morpurgo, supra note 7, at 360; see also id. at 362 (discussing the development of
TPLF as a viable and growing economic industry in the United States); Susan Lorde Martin,
The Litigation FinancingIndustry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAMJ. CORP. & FIN. L. 55,55 (2004) (noting that "[l]ending money to plaintiffs
to finance their lawsuits ha[d] become an industry within the last ten years").
9.

See VIcKI WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS: LAW, POLICY & FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN

AUSTRALIA, UK & US 111(2008); see also Susan Lorde Martin, LitigationFinancing:Another
Subprime Industry That has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 84
(2008) ("[T]he litigation financing industry is most often recognized in the popular, professional and academic presses because of its relationships with poor individual plaintiffs.").
10. Third Party Litigation Funding (TPLF), U.S. CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM
Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/third-party-litigation-funding [https://perma.cc/7AQE-NMT7]; see also BURFORD CAPITAL, 2017 INTERIM REPORT 1, 4

(stating that Burford Capital, a major litigation finance firm, as of the first half of 2017 had
"$3.1 billion invested in and available for legal finance"), https://www.burfordcapital.
com/media/1527/bur-27947-interim-report-2017_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q3V-HLJP].
11. See Shannon, supra note 7, at 864; infra notes 40-43. It is also worth noting that
while scholarly commentary on TPLF has grown as it has grown as an industry, it remains

a relatively unresearched topic in terms of empirical data and studies. See Ronen Avraham
& Anthony Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third Party Consumer Litigant Funding,
104 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1136, 1140 (2019); see also id. at 1140 n.33.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See id.
17. See Litigation Funding Transparency Act of 2019, S. 471, 116th Cong. (2019); infra
Part III.C.
18. See Letter from Various In-House Counsel for U.S. Corporations to Rebecca Womeldorf, Secretary, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of Practice and Procedure (Jan. 31,
2019) (discussing requirement for disclosure of TPLF agreements in civil actions),
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites//TPLF_1etter_1.31.19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9Q7M-63BJ]; infra Part III.C.
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TPLF disclosure regulation hurts the legitimacy of the civil trial
system by denying fairness to all parties to a lawsuit, and as a result
jurisdictions should adopt rules similar to those that have been
adopted and proposed.
Part I of this Note will briefly outline the history of third-party
standing and TPLF. Part II will focus in detail on the Gawker
case. Part III will look at what rules currently exist regulating TPLF
and what rules are being proposed. Part IV will advocate for the
adoption of the above-mentioned adopted and proposed rules. Part V
will address counter arguments opposed to rules requiring forcible
disclosure by showing that requiring TPLF disclosure is in line with
American notions of fairness to the parties and that any concerns
about forcible disclosure are outweighed by the interests in preserving
fair hearings for all litigants. Part VI concludes.19
II.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING

Article III of the U.S. Constitution "gives the federal courts
jurisdiction over only 'cases and controversies,' and the doctrine of
standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately
resolved through the judicial process."" The Supreme Court has held
that "the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging
part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." 21 The
traditional rationales for standing range from preserving separation
of powers,22 to rationing limited judicial resources." As a result, third
parties have historically been unable to litigate the rights of others

19. This Note will only address disclosure of TPLF agreements between third-party financiers and plaintiffs. Other kinds of TPLF agreements are outside the scope of this Note
and are discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Shannon, supra note 7, at 861.
20. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990); see also U.S. CONST., art. III,
§ 2 (enumerating the various cases and controversies the judicial power extends to).
21. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The Court has held there
are three elements to the standing doctrine:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) "actual
or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical[.]"' Second, there must be a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ...
be "fairly ...
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court."
Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will
be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
22. See, e.g., Ehud Guttel, Alon Harel, & Shay Lavie, Torts for Nonvictims: The Case
for Third-PartyLitigation, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1049, 1056 (2018).
23. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis,
86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 684 (1973).
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because plaintiffs must assert their own legal rights. 4 This prohibition,
however, is not absolute, and the Court has "recogniz[ed] that there
may be circumstances where it is necessary to grant a third party
standing to assert the rights of another."2
Prior to the U.S. Constitution, medieval English common law also
restricted the ability of third parties to become involved in litigation,
namely through laws prohibiting the practices of maintenance,
champerty, and barratry. 26 The argument for banning such practices
was they were believed to incentivize frivolous lawsuits.27 And while
these proscriptions "traveled with English common law into the U.S. [,]"
over time most jurisdictions "gradually loosened" enforcement of
these doctrines; 2 today, many jurisdictions have abolished the bans
altogether. 29 Generally, the reasoning for leaving these doctrines
behind is they have outlived their utility and there are other legal
theories better suited for preventing frivolous and fraudulent claims; 30
namely, the growth of legal ethics and other means of sanction for
abusive litigation have helped address these needs. 3
24. E.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (discussing that for an injury to
be particularized, the plaintiff must have suffered in a personal and individual way). But see
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (upholding third-party standing on the grounds that
the Supreme Court's restrictions on third-party standing "are not constitutionally mandated,
but rather stem from a salutary 'rule of self-restraint"').
25. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129-30 (2004) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 411 (1991)); see also Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (recognizing an exception to the general ban on third-party standing where the third party has a
close relationship with the aggrieved party and there is some hindrance to the right-holder's
ability to litigate his own interests).
26. See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People's Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding,
56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 652 (2005); see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978) ("Put
simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in
return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty.") (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *128, *134-36); see
generally Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48 (1935) (tracing the
development of these practices from ancient Greek and Roman law to medieval English common law).
27. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can and Should the New Third-PartyLitigation Financing
Come to Class Actions?, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 109, 112 n.4 (2018).
28. E.g., Cassandra B. Robertson, The Impact of Third-PartyFinancing on Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 159, 164 (2011).
29. See Richmond, supra note 26, at 653 (listing cases from various state courts discarding these doctrines); see also Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61,
98-99 (2011) (listing various jurisdictions which now permit the practices of champerty and
maintenance).
30. Richmond, supra note 26, at 653 (quoting Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532
S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000)) ("[O]ther well-developed principles of law can more effectively
accomplish the goals of preventing speculation in groundless lawsuits and the filing of frivolous suits" than the doctrines of maintenance, champerty, and barratry); see also Shannon,
supra note 7, at 874 (tracing the doctrines of maintenance and champerty all the way back
to Greek and Roman legal systems and discussing how they have fallen out of favor in various nations globally).
31. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 27, at 112 n.4.
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These dated legal theories would at one time have made TPLF
an untenable industry-so restrictive were the prohibitions on these
practices that even something as routine as an attorney working for
a contingency fee would likely have been impermissible. 32 It is
undeniable, however, that the trend in modern litigation is toward
allowing TPLF agreements. 33 As a result, it is now generally viewed
as acceptable for plaintiffs to sell or contract away a certain percentage
34
of their potential recovery in exchange for funding by a third party.
And while some courts may still view TPLF with some skepticism,"
the modern scholarly view is that such practices are ethical. 36
Such practices can also help even the playing field between wealthy
defendants and indigent plaintiffs who would otherwise have to forego
litigation if not for the availability of TPLF.37
In the United States, TPLF as a viable industry began to take
root in earnest in the mid-1990s.38 This followed from the abovementioned changes to the doctrinal landscape that saw more widespread acceptance of previously taboo practices, such as working
off contingency fees. 39 Initially, the practice was pursued by those
with relatively noble (i.e., non-financial) ends in mind.40 It must
be noted, however, that as TPLF has become more prevalent in
American litigation, so too has the amount of money involved.
32. See, e.g., Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical
Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615, 625 (2007); Richmond, supra note 26, at 655; Sebok, supra note
29, at 99-100.
33. Ronen Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third-PartyLitigation Funding- A Signaling Model, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 233, 242-45 (2014) (discussing the ways and to what extent
various jurisdictions have embraced TPLF).
34. Fitzpatrick, supra note 27, at 112 (citing AM. BAR AsS'N COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20,
WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE LITIGATIONs FINANCING 9 (2011)).

35. See Richmond, supra note 26, at 651 ("The emergence of litigation funding as a new
financial services industry has been marked by judicial distrust.") (citing Gary Young, Two
Setbacks for Lawsuit Financingbut the PracticeIs Still Alive and Well, NAT'L L.J., July 28,
2003, at Al (noting decisions in Ohio and North Carolina and remarking that "[t]he business
of litigation finance is battered but upright after taking a beating in two courtrooms in the
last year")).
36. See, e.g., Shannon, supra note 7, at 875; McLaughlin, supra note 32, at 625; Sebok,
supra note 29, at 107-08.
37. See Susan Lorde Martin, FinancingLitigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles,
1 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 85, 95 (2002) (discussing the benefits of litigation funding for
plaintiffs who sue wealthy business defendants).
38. Morpurgo, supra note 7, at 362; Martin, supra note 8 at 55.
39. See McLaughlin, supra note 32, at 625.
40. See Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business
Opportunity?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 507 (1992) ("The primary policy reason for permitting
investors to support the litigation of others in exchange for a share of the proceeds of the
litigation, if there are any, is to allow those with meritorious claims, but insufficient funds
to pursue them, access to courts.").
41. See Morpurgo, supra note 7, at 362 ("[A] market ... exists . .. specifically centered
on commercially-focused TPLF ... this can be considered an 'upper' market, where a small
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Large investment banks and hedge funds, such as Buford Capital
and Bentham IMF, play an outsized role in the market.42 Thus, while
TPLF may play a role in leveling the playing field for plaintiffs in need
of funding, there is no doubt that it has become a profitable venture
for the third parties doing said funding.4 3 And while the majority of
TPLF is a matter of pure business, the Gawker case represents an
instance where an extremely wealthy individual funded litigation not
for any monetary gain, but simply as a means of acting out his personal
revenge."
III. THE GAWKER CASE

Peter Thiel is a Silicon Valley entrepreneur and billionaire,
best known for cofounding PayPal and being an early investor in
Facebook.45 In 2007, on its Valleywag blog, Gawker Media revealed
that Peter Thiel was a homosexual with an article headlined, "Peter
Thiel is totally gay, people." 46 From then on, Thiel sought ways of
seeking revenge against Gawker for the embarrassment he suffered. 7
It was not until 2011, when Thiel was approached by someone
known as Mr. A, that his plan began to see real progress. 48 Mr. A, a
young acquaintance of Thiel's, proposed that the billionaire use his
considerable wealth to create a shell company whose sole purpose
was funding investigators and lawyers to seek out cases that could
bankrupt Gawker. 49
number of companies provide large dollar amounts to corporate actors who prefer turning to
TPLF rather than risk their own assets to cover litigation costs."); Jacob Gershman, Lawsuit
Funding, Long Hidden in the Shadows, Faces Calls for More Sunlight, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuit-funding-long-hidden-in-the-shadowsfaces-calls-for-more-sunlight-1521633600 [https://perma.cc/24WM-6V6T].
42. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 27, at 112; see also BURFORD CAPITAL, supra note 10, at
4.

43. Kevin M. LaCroix, Why Are Investors Seeking Litigation Funding Opportunities?
Because Litigation FundingIs Profitable, D&O DIARY (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.dandodiary.com/2015/03/articlesflitigation-financing-2/why-are-investors-seeking-litigation-fund-

ing-opportunities-because-litigation-funding-is-profitable/ [https://perma.cc/ZS5D-6WHK].
44. See Sebok, supra note 29, at 103 ("One can imagine a third party gratuitously supporting a stranger's litigation with either money or non-monetary aid, just out of pure spite

or malevolence towards the target of the person aided by the maintainer. This could be described as malice maintenance.") (emphasis in original).
45. See Sorkin, supra note 6.

46.

Id.

47.

Derek Thompson, The Most Expensive Comment in Internet History?, THE ATLANTIC

(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/02/hogan-thiel-gawkertrial/554132/ [https://perma.cc/CBV7-X632]; see also Mac & Drange, supra note 4 (reporting
that Thiel referred to Valleywag as "the Silicon Valley equivalent of Al Qaeda" in 2009).
48. Thompson, supra note 47. It was later revealed that Mr. A is an Australian citizen
named Aron D'Souza. Ryan Mac, This Man Helped Peter Thiel Demolish Gawker, BUZZFEED
NEWS (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/this-is-the-man-whohelped-peter-thiel-demolish-gawker-mr-a [https://perma.cc/RV3Q-AZWB].
49. Thompson, supra note 47.
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Thiel finally hit on a promising lead in 2012, when Gawker obtained
a videotape from 2006 showing Terry Bollea, known to the world as
the wrestler Hulk Hogan, engaged in sexual activities with the wife of
his best friend: a Florida radio shock jock named Todd Clem (better
known as Bubba the Love Sponge).5 0 Gawker published the video
online with the headline "Even for a Minute, Watching Hulk
Hogan Have Sex in a Canopy Bed is Not Safe for Work but Watch it
Anyway."" Following the publication, Bollea filed multiple lawsuits
against Gawker: first in federal court seeking an injunction-which
was ultimately dismissed "-and then, after changing legal teams,
in state court alleging, inter alia, invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the Florida Security
and Communications Act. 3
As the litigation commenced, Gawker's lawyers were unawareand remained unaware throughout the trial-that Bollea had a silent
partner in the lawsuit: Thiel. 4 While there was some speculation in
the media that a silent investor could be funding Bollea's litigation
costs," Thiel's involvement only came to light after the trial ended.'6
The jury, unaware of Thiel's involvement, ultimately awarded Bollea
$140 million in damages: $115 million in compensatory damages
jointly and severally against Gawker Media, Gawker chief executive
and founder Nick Denton ("Denton"), and former Gawker editor-inchief Albert Daulerio ("Daulerio"); $15 million in punitive damages
against Gawker; $10 million in punitive damages against Denton; and
$100,000 in punitive damages against Daulerio."

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
53. Thompson, supranote 47.
54. Id. This was not the first lawsuit Thiel had funded against Gawker, he had in fact
been "the clandestine financier of numerous lawsuits targeting Gawker Media." Ryan Mac
& Matt Drange, Behind Peter Thiel's Plan to Destroy Gawker, FORBES (June 29, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2016/06/07/behind-peter-thiel-plan-to-destroygawker/#43dd3f980f4./ [https://perma.cc/GW5G-ZC25].
55. Dan Abrams, Might a Gawker Hater be Covering Hulk Hogan's Legal Bills?, LAW
& CRIME (Mar. 9, 2016, 12:06 PM), https://ILawandcrime.com/high-profile/might-an-antigawker-benefactor-be-covering-hulk-hogans-legal-bills/ [https://perma.cc/4CBK-FC9L].
56. Mac & Drange, supra note 4.
57. Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 522012CA012447, 2016 WL 4073660, at *1-2
(Fla. Pinellas County Ct. June 8, 2016); see also Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million to
Gawker's Bill in Hulk Hogan Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
[https://
com/2016/03/22/business/media/hulk-hogan-damages-25-million-gawker-case.html
perma.cc/J6T7-CSFQ].
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Shortly after the judgment Gawker filed for bankruptcy,5 8 and
eventually sold itself to fellow media company Univision. 9 Two
months after the sale, Gawker settled with Bollea for $31 million. 60
However, the fallout was not limited to just Gawker: Denton also had
to file for personal bankruptcy, 61 and Daulerio was embroiled in further litigation as Bollea's legal team sought to freeze his assets.6 2 Following the sale and settlement, Univision removed any Gawker
articles related to the litigation and the flagship website, Gawker.com
was shut down.63 This was likely out of an abundance of caution
as Bollea's lawyer, Charles Harder ("Harder"), was also at the time
representing other plaintiffs suing Gawker. 64
Prior to the reveal of Thiel's involvement, Denton spoke with the
New York Times about his suspicion that there may have been ulterior
motives behind Bollea's lawsuit, especially as even more lawsuits were
being brought against Gawker and its writers. 65 Denton actually
believed a figure from Silicon Valley was likely funding the litigation,
telling the paper, "[i]f you're a billionaire and you don't like the
coverage of you, and you don't particularly want to embroil yourself
any further in a public scandal, it's a pretty smart, rational thing to
fund other legal cases." 66 Harder, for his part, refused to reveal
whether someone other than Bollea was paying the litigation costs
he was accruing while representing his client. 67 However, certain

58. Ember, supra note 2.
59. Sydney Ember, Gawker Is Said To Be Sold to Univision in a $135 Million Bid, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/business/media/gawker-sale/
html [https://perma.cc/7T2J-EHFK].
60. Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03lbusiness/media/gawker-hulk-hogansettlement.html [https://perma.cc/E8BW-8UL8].
61. See Sydney Ember, Nick Denton Filesfor Bankruptcy, Just Weeks After Gawker Did,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/business/media/nick-denton-gawker-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/N7CD-JQZQ].
62. Matt Drange & Ryan Mac, Ex-Gawker Editor on the Verge of Bankruptcy After Hulk
Hogan's Lawyers Freeze His Assets, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/mattdrange/2016/08/11/835/#2ce27e275d38./ [https://perma.cc/BND8-KRGL].
63. Ember, supra note 60.
64. See Mac & Drange, supra note 4.
65. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Gawker Founder Suspects a Common FinancerBehind
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/business/
dealbook/gawker-founder-suspects-a-common-financer-behind-lawsuits.html [https://perma.
cc/HD8T-SBBA].
66. Id.
67. Id.
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actions taken during the lawsuit may have tipped Harder's hand, all
but confirming that the lawsuit was not entirely motivated by purely
financial desires. 68
There is evidence that had Gawker's legal team known of Thiel's
69
involvement it would have adopted a different litigation strategy.
Because Thiel was allowed to remain in the shadows, not only was
Gawker's legal team unable to mount a maximally effective litigation
strategy, but (perhaps more importantly) the jury was also kept in
70
the dark about the personal animus driving the lawsuit. And while
this information arguably would not (and should not) have changed
the jury's verdict regarding the compensatory damages related to the
underlying legal claims, it is not unthinkable that such information
would have played a role in the punitive damages calculation.
Unfortunately for Gawker, no such rule requiring disclosure of TPLF
currently exists in Florida.72

68. Id. Some of these actions include dropping the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") since it was the one claim whose defense costs Gawker's insurance
company was required to cover as well as pay any potential settlement payouts. Id. This is
combined with the fact that Bollea's legal team turned down numerous settlement offers,
was seen as an odd strategy by legal commentators, especially for a plaintiff ostensibly paying his lawyer on a contingency fee. Id.
69. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 47.
If you're fighting Hulk Hogan alone, you file motions and drag it out to be as
painful as possible for Hogan, in the hopes that he'll settle. But if you're fighting
a billionaire, what you do not do is try to drag out the trial as long as possible.
That won't work. If Gawker suspected Thiel's involvement, they should have
publicly cast aspersions and even make a case to the jury that a billionaire was
behind the whole thing. If you are being hounded by a billionaire, you want to
make yourself as sympathetic as possible. But I suspect the Gawker team simply
didn't realize what was happening until it was too late.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
70. See Sebok, supranote 29, at 103. At least one state supreme court has observed that
malice maintenance is indistinguishable from malicious prosecution, i.e., abuse of process.

Id. (citing Wolford v. Tankersley, 695 P.2d 1201, 1222 (Idaho 1984) (Bistline, J., dissenting)).
71. See infra Part IV.B.
72. See infra Part III.B; note 85. As of early 2020, lawmakers in Florida are considering
legislation that would require state regulation of litigation funding companies. See Jim
J.
Sams, Litigation Funding Bills Crop Up in State Houses Across the Country, CLAIMS
39
.htm
(Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2020/02/18/2955
[https://perma.cc/BKP6-E29G].
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IV. SURVEY OF EXISTING RULES AND
PROPOSALS FOR THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING

A.

FederalRules

As of early 2020, there are currently no federal rules requiring
mandatory disclosure of TPLF agreements. 73 While six federal
circuit courts of appeal have local rules requiring identifying TPLF
financiers," none of these local rules require the disclosure of the
actual TPLF agreement itself. 7 Despite these circuits expanding
disclosure beyond Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, their
local rules are nonetheless not identical to each other. 76 No federal
district court requires mandatory disclosure of TPLF agreements. 77
However, of the ninety-four federal district courts, twenty-four require
disclosure of the identity of TPLF financiers, either through a local
rule-fourteen districts-a required disclosure statement formten districts-or a standing order to all judges in that districttwo districts.78 One district in particular, the Northern District of
California, stands out because in 2016 it amended its standing order
to require TPLF disclosure in class action lawsuits, effective January
of 2017.79

&

73. See Shannon, supra note 7, at 867; see also ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. R. PRAC.
PROC., MEMORANDUM ON THE SURVEY OF FEDERAL AND STATE DISCLOSURE RULES
REGARDING LITIGATION FUNDING 209 (Feb. 7, 2018) (memorandum surveying relevant

federal and state laws dealing with TPLF disclosure), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/2018-04-civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXA2-JHWY].
74. See MEMORANDUM, supranote 73, at 208.
75. Id.; see also id. at 219-21 (Appendix A listing federal Circuits with local rules requiring some form of TPLF disclosure); 3d Cir. L. R. 26.1.1(b); 4th Cir. L. R. 26.1(2)(B); 5th
Cir. L. R. 28.2.1; 6th Cir. L. R. 26.1(b)(2); 10th Cir. L. R. 46.1(D); 11th Cir. L. R. 26.1-1(a)(1);
11th Cir. L. R. 26.1-2(a).
76. See Memorandum, supra note 73, at 209-10. Compare 3d Cir. L. R. 26.1.1(b) (requiring only parties to an appeal to file disclosure statements), with 11th Cir. L. R. 26.11(a)(1) (requiring both parties to an appeal as well as amicus curiae to file disclosure statements).
77. See Memorandum, supra note 73, at 210.

-

-

78. Id.; see also id. at 223-29 (Appendix B listing federal District Courts with local rules
requiring some form of TPLF disclosure); D. Ariz. Form - Corporate Disclosure Statement;
C.D. Cal. L. R. 7.1-1; N.D. Cal. L. R. 3-15; Standing Order for all N.D. Cal. Judges; M.D. Fla.
Interested Persons Order for Civil Cases; N.D. Ga. L. R. 3.3; S.D. Ga. L. R. 7.1; N.D. Iowa L.
R. 7.1; S.D. Iowa L.R. 7.1; D. Md. L. R. 103.3(b); E.D. Mich. L. R. 83.4; W.D. Mich. Form
Corporate Disclosure Statement; D. Nev. L. R. 7.1-1; E.D.N.C. L. R. 7.3; M.D.N.C. Form
Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations; W.D.N.C. Form - Entities with a Direct Financial Interest in Litigation Form; N.D. Ohio L. Civ. R. 3.13(b); N.D. Ohio Form - Corporate Disclosure Statement; S.D. Ohio L. R. 7.1.1; E.D. Okla. Form - Corporate Disclosure Statement;
N.D. Okla. Form - Corporate Disclosure Statement; N.D. Tex. L. R. 3.1(c); N.D. Tex. L. R.
3.2(e); N.D. Tex. 7.4; N.D. Tex. L. R. 81.1; W.D. Tex. L. R. CV-33; W.D. Va. Form - Disclosure
of Corporate Affiliations and Other Entities with a Direct Financial Interest in Litigation;
W.D. Wis. Form - Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations and Financial Interest.
79. See Memorandum, supranote 73, at 211.
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State Rules

In April of 2018, Wisconsin became the first state to pass a law
requiring the disclosure of TPLF agreements. 80 Upon its passage,
one commentator remarked that this statute "appear[ed] to be the
first law of its kind in the United States, and comes amid a continued
push by litigation finance opponents to increase transparency in the
industry."81 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal
Reform referred to the law as "groundbreaking.1 8 2 West Virginia, in
2019, became only the second state to regulate TPLF in a similar
fashion to Wisconsin, laying out clear registration requirements for
TPLF financiers as well as strict requirements for the contracts
these companies execute with plaintiffs. 83 And, in contrast to the
federal courts, no state court (excluding Wisconsin and West Virginia)
requires the disclosure of TPLF financiers. 4 That said, eight states
have enacted some form of TPLF regulation, the majority concerned
with making sure TPLF financiers do not impermissibly interfere
with the course of litigation, and more look ready to follow Wisconsin
85
and West Virginia's lead.

80. WIS. STAT. § 804.01(2)(bg) (2018).
Third party agreements. Except as otherwise stipulated or ordered by the
court, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other
parties any agreement under which any person, other than an attorney permitted to charge a contingent fee representing a party, has a right to receive compensation that is contingent on and sourced from any proceeds of the civil action,
by settlement, judgment, or otherwise.

Id.
81. Ben Hancock, LitigationFunding Deals Must Be Disclosed Under Groundbreaking
Wisconsin Law, NAT'L L.J. (Apr. 04, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/
04/04/wisconsin-litigation-funding/ [https://perma.cc/A4R5-S5Y6].
82. Lisa A. Rickard, Wisconsin Forward: State Enacts Groundbreaking Litigation
Funding Transparency Law, U.S. CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM (Apr. 03. 2018),
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/wisconsin-forward-state-enacts-ground-

breaking-litigation-funding-transparency-law [https://perma.cc/KU2H-JDLU].
83. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6N-1-6N-9 (2019); see also Nicholas Mooney, WV Legislature
Amends Consumer Protection Statute to Regulate and Impose Restrictions on Litigation Financiers, JD SUPRA (Nov. 5, 2019), jdsupra.com/legalnews/wv-legislature-amends-consumer-

-

21470/ [https://perma.cc/A33V-X5E7].
84. See W. VA. CODE § 46A-6N-2-6N-3; WIS. STAT. § 804.01(2)(bg); see also Memorandum, supra note 73, at 215.
85. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 215; see also id. at 217 (Table 1 listing states that
have enacted some form of TPLF regulation); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-57-104, 4-57-109; IND.
CODE §§ 24-4.5-1-201.1, 24-4.5-1-301.5, 24-4.5-3-110, 24-4.5-3-110.5, 24-4.5-3-202, 24-4.5-3502, 24-12; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-a, §§ 12-101 to -107; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3301 to 3309; OHIO
REV. CODE § 1349.55; OKLA. STAT. tit. 14-A, §§ 3-801 to 3-817; TENN. CODE §§ 47-16-101 to
110; VT. STAT. tit. 8, §§ 2251-2260. The states that as of early 2020 are considering legislation
to regulate TPLF and require greater disclosure are Florida, New York, and Utah. See Sams,

supra note 72. Seven bills have been introduced in New York's state Assembly, one each in
Florida's House of Representatives and Senate, and one in Utah's House. Id.
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ProposedRules

Beginning in late 2018 and continuing into 2019, the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform advocated on behalf of
two different proposals that would require disclosure of TPLF
agreements to all parties to a lawsuit. 86 The first is the Litigation
Funding Transparency Act, initially introduced in the Senate in
2018 and then reintroduced in 2019.87 While a laudable start, the Act
would only require disclosure of TPLF agreements for class actions
and multidistrict litigation suits, as well as when a TPLF agreement
involved cash financing between the third party and the plaintiff.8 8
The other proposal goes further and is a recommendation forwarded
to the 2019 Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of Practice and
Procedure for the federal courts, seeking an amendment to Rule
26(a)(1)(A).8 9 If adopted, this change to Rule 26(a)(1)(A) would require
"the disclosure of agreements giving a non-party or non-counsel
the contingent right to receive compensation from proceeds of the
litigation." 90 There have been various arguments made both in favor of
and against adopting these proposed rules. Parts IV and V of this Note
examine these arguments in greater depth.
V. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ADOPTING RULES REQUIRING
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING DISCLOSURE

This Note posits that regulation is desperately needed regarding
TPLF disclosure for two principal reasons: first, as a matter of fairness
to the parties involved, and second, TPLF disclosures should not affect
86.

Lisa A. Rickard, Third-PartyLitigationFunders Fight Hard to Stay in the Shadows,

N.Y. L.J. ONLINE (Aug. 27,

2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/08/27/

third-party-litigation-funders-fight-hard-to-stay-in-the-shadows/
[https://perma.ce/SBK27BDT].
87. See Litigation Funding Transparency Act of 2019, S. 471, 116th Cong. (2019). See
also Ross Todd, Republican Senators Reintroduce Bill Pushing for Disclosure of Litigation
Funding, NAT'L L.J. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.law.com/nationllawjournal/2019/02/13/
republican-senators-reintroduce-bill-pushing-for-disclosure-of-litigation-funding/
[https://perma.cc/T5RM-BTVT].
88. See Todd, supra note 87.
89. Letter from Thirty In-House Counsel for U.S. Corporations, supra note 18. This letter was signed by in-house counsel representing the Allstate Corporation, AT&T, Inc., Bayer
U.S., BP America, Inc., the Charles Schwab Corp., Chevron Corp., Comcast Corp., CVS
Health, Eli Lilly and Company, Ford Motor Company, General Electric, GlaxoSmithKline,
LLC, Google, Honeywell Int'l, Inc., ITT, Inc., the Home Depot, Johnson & Johnson, Liberty
Mutual Holding Co., Inc., MassMutual, Merck & Co., Inc., Microsoft Corp., Phillips 66, RiverStone, RPM Int'l, Inc., Shell Oil Co., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Verizon Wireless, Westfield, and Zurich North America. Id.
90.

Id.; see also Letter from Thirty Corporate and Defense Counsel Organizations to

Rebecca Womeldorf, Secretary, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of Practice and Procedure
(July 1, 2017) (an earlier letter akin to the 2019 letter proposing a similar amendment to
Rule 26), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/17-cv-o-suggestion_ilr_et_al_O.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JJ8F-83N6]. The 2017 letter notes that many of the signatory organizations had proposed these changes going all the way back to 2014. Id.
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verdicts since they will not change the substantive facts and laws at
issue. However, TPLF could deter juries from leveling unnecessarily
steep punitive damages against defendants when a TPLF agreement
is motivated purely by malice. The lack of current regulation leaves
open the possibility of individuals funding lawsuits purely out of
personal animus against a defendant, as seen in the Gawker case.
A.

Third-PartyLitigationFundingDisclosure
Creates a FairerPlayingField

The proponents behind the above-mentioned proposed rules
argue they only seek disclosure of TPLF agreements to even the
playing field, not as a means of unnecessarily regulating the practice
to the point it is no longer feasible. 91 Their rationale is that disclosure
would create a similar scheme of disclosure for TPLF that Rule
26(a)(1)(A)(iv) currently requires of all insurance agreements in civil
cases. 92 Rule 26 mandates that parties must disclose "any insurance
agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy
all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or
reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment." 93 Courts
have construed Rule 26 as "clearly designed for parties to produce documentation of any insurance policies that give rise to an insurer's obligation to indemnify or hold its insured harmless for a judgment. Like94
wise, the legislative history supports this interpretation." Thus, a
mirror provision for TPLF agreements would only be fair when a third
party is funding the defense's case.
Advocates for adoption also point out that commercial litigation
finance has grown by 414% between 2014 and 2017, a statistic not
disputed by TPLF financiers. 95 And while some do not see this as cause
for concern, 96 others see the unchecked rise in TPLF as a troubling
trend across the legal landscape, especially because there has not
been an analogous rise in regulation designed to appropriately check
TPLF. 97 After all, TPLF has become a billion-dollar industry and the
largest TPLF firms raise millions in investment funding. 98 And yet,
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See Letter from Thirty In-House Counsel for U.S. Corporations, supra note 18.
Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv).
See, e.g., Excelsior College v. Frye, 233 F.R.D. 583, 585 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
David Perla, Control: A Common Question About Litigation Finance, N.Y. L. J.

ONLINE (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/08/14/control-a-com-

mon-question-about-litigation-finance/ [https://perma.cc/VD6P-TTCU].
96. See id.
97. See Rickard, supra note 86.
98. See Gershman, supra note 41. As of Dec. 31, 2017, Longford Capital had raised $550
million in total capital; Parabellum Capital had raised $250 million; Bentham IMF had
raised $233 million; Lake Whillans had raised $190 million. Id. Burford Capital, another
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because of the astounding lack of overall regulation, the individuals
running these firms are allowed to remain in the shadows, depriving
courts and juries from the knowledge of who is actually financing
litigation costs. 99
The American civil trial system is premised on tenets of equality
and fairness between the parties.100 The very first Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure states the purpose of the Rules is to "secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."10' The
Seventh Amendment enshrines the right to jury trial in civil actions. 1 02
And jurists throughout the history of this nation have fully embraced
this notion of a right to a fair trial, from Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes,1 03 to Justice Owen Roberts,1 04 to Chief Justice Earl Warren.'10
Many of the problems plaguing the current TPLF practice would be
remedied by greater disclosure.1 06 The simple truth is that the current
rules in place, or lack thereof, are simply not adequate in curbing the
potential for abuse of TPLF. 107
B. Third-Party LitigationFundingDisclosure
Could Potentially Affect Punitive Damages Calculations
The Gawker case supports the argument that while TPLF
disclosure should not have substantial effects on jury verdicts, by
withholding TPLF information it can and does fatally alter the course
major finance litigation firm, had raised $3.1 billion as of the first half of 2017. BURFORD
CAPITAL, supra note 10, at 4.

99.

Gershman, supra note 41.

100. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS princ. L.A at 3 (AM. BAR ASS'N
2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/american_jury/princi-

ples.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NSV-5UAW].
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2018) (emphasis added).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
103. See Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Whatever
disagreement there may be as to the scope of the phrase 'due process of law,' there can be no
doubt that it embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be
heard.").
104. See Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) ("The aim of the requirement of
due process is . . to prevent fundamental unfairness .... ").
105. See, e.g., Roger J. Traynor, Chief Justice Warren's Fair Question, 58 GEO. L. REV. 1,
5 (1969) ("Chief Justice Warren impressed upon the Supreme Court of his time, and hence
upon the country, the nobility summed up in his eternal question: Is it fair?") (emphasis in
original).
106. Michael German, Perspectivesfrom a Litigation Funder: The Case for Sensible Disclosure, N.Y. L. J. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/01/31/perspectives-from-a-litigation-funder-the-case-for-sensible-disclosure/
[https://perma.cc/SH4STQ83]; see also Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913,
at 10 ("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.").
107. See Lisa A. Rickard & Mark A. Behrens, OPINION: 3rd-PartyLitigation Funding
Transparency, LAW360 (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/852142/opinion-3rdparty-litigation-funding-needs-transparency [https://perma.cc/S93T-XXCE].
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of litigation resulting in serious consequences.1 08 Thiel admitted he
had no interest in actually profiting off of Bollea's suit, rather he
saw it as a business venture. 109 Thiel's motives surrounding the
lawsuit, had they come to light, would likely have been deemed
unethical and possibly incurred sanctions for Bollea's attorney,
Harder.11 0 It is not improbable to think that had the jury known the
full picture they would not have awarded Bollea such a hefty punitive
damages award."'
Our trial system is premised on the notion that interested parties
marshal their arguments in order to best vindicate their interests." 2
However, TPLF motivated by personal animus raises ethical questions
about the validity of such agreements." 3 Because TPLF financiers are
allowed to remain in the shadows, it is difficult for a court or jury to
truly know how much influence they wield on the litigation." 4 In cases
such as Gawker, with millions of dollars on the line and punitive
damages at play, it is only right that the court and jury be fully armed
with the facts before leveling any judgments.
Further, had the Gawker legal team known of Thiel's involvement
in the suit, they likely would have pursued an extremely different legal
strategy." 5 And this information would have been relevant for the jury
when calculating punitive damages. Given the two justifications for
punitive damages-to punish behavior that offends moral values and
to deter such behavior in the future by making it unacceptably risky
to pursue' 1 6-there is a chance the jury would have declined to level
the additional $25 million in punitive damages on the defendants." 7
Had the jury known that Bollea was not truly in control of his
own, putative lawsuit, it would likely have had an effect on their

108.
109.

See Sorkin, supra note 6.

See id.
110. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983) (restricting
lawyers from accepting payment from someone other than the client unless "there is no in-

terference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship"); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
111. Madigan, supra note 57.
112. E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury.").
113. See, e.g., JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA MILLER, & GARY RUBIN, SELLING LAWSUITS,
BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2009),

https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2HN-JU5F].
114. See Shannon, supra note 7, at 903.
115. Cf. Thompson, supra note 47.
116.

2007).
117.

NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 305 (1st ed.

Madigan, supra note 57.
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deliberations, especially if they had also known the entire reason for
the litigation was because a billionaire wanted revenge on a media
company that angered and embarrassed him.
VI. REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST
ADOPTING RULES REQUIRING
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING DISCLOSURE

Those in favor of keeping the TPLF status quo have voiced their
concern with the proposed rules."" Their defense generally focuses on
the idea that a TPLF financier does not control the litigation, unlike a
scenario where an insurance company is helping to fund a defendant's
case.119 As such, proponents of the current system argue "[c]ommercial
litigation financiers, as a general rule, are never in control of the
litigation, and each deal is usually set up to make that explicit."120 And
although there is validity to the idea that in theory TPLF financiers
are forbidden from meddling in the litigation,"' because there are no
rules requiring transparency it makes monitoring these ethical rules
extremely difficult in reality."'
As a further rebuke to advocates resisting change, there have
been recent instances where courts have required some level of TPLF
disclosure to preserve fairness in the case. In the Northern District
of Ohio, a judge ordered the parties in an opioid litigation case to
disclose the details of any TPLF agreements to the court in camera."'
In another instance, a court in Pennsylvania dismissed a case
because it concluded a TPLF agreement was champertous and thus

118. See LETTER FROM TPLF FINANCIERS TO REBECCA WOMELDORF, SECRETARY,
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Feb. 20, 2019),

This letter
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FSB9z-IcH6PcNDP31GJbpvOnOVxoGg7l/view.
was signed by officers from Therium Capital Management, Bentham IMF, and Buford Capital, three of the largest TPLF firms.
119. See Perla, supra note 95.
120. See id.
121.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.

1.8(f)

(Am. Bar Ass'n 1983).

122. Shannon, supra note 7, at 903 ("[L]itigation funding takes place largely in secret,
and there is no general rule that the parties or their legal counsel must disclose identities of
occurs in sefunders."); see also Rickard & Behrens, supra note 107 ([B]ecause [TPLF] ...
crecy, the proof needed to support reform is elusive.").
123. See In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litigation, No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2018 WL 2127807,
at *1(N.D. Ohio May 7, 2018); Kevin LaCroix, Federal Judge Orders LitigationFunding Disclosure to the Court, Rather than to Opposing Parties, D&O DIARY (May 8, 2018),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/05/articles/litigation-financing-2/federal-judge-orders-litigation-funding-disclosure-court-rather-opposing-parties/ [https://perma.cc/BEZ5-R7XT].
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unenforceable.12 4 And in 2018, a federal court in Delaware granted
a motion to compel disclosure of litigation-funding documents, finding
such disclosure relevant."
The takeaway from these cases is that clear regulation is
desperately needed in the field of TPLF, as the lack of rules leaves
it open to exploitation due to the only patchy framework that currently
exists. "The aim of the liberal discovery rules is to make trial 'less a
game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest."'126 The inequity
between defendants who are left blindly attempting to organize their
litigation strategy versus plaintiffs who are permitted to have wealthy
financiers bankroll their suits shows this is an instance where, as multiple courts have recognized in the past, 'what is good for the goose is
good for the gander.'1 2 7
VII.

CONCLUSION

TPLF agreements have become common in the civil trial system,
with both outside investment firms and wealthy individuals helping
to bankroll litigants who, they argue, would otherwise not be able
to defend their rights in court due to the insurmountable costs of
litigation. Those who defend this system argue it levels the playing
field, namely by allowing less financially-affluent individuals access
to the justice system in return for a small share of rewards to the
financiers. However, given the current lax state of regulation-both
in federal and state courts-opponents argue TPLF allows wealthy

124. WFIC, LLC v. LaBarre, 148 A.3d 812, 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) ("The requisite
elements of champerty have all clearly been met in the present case. The [TPLF firms] are
completely unrelated parties who had no legitimate interest in the [litigation].").
125. See Acceleration Bay LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. 16-453-RGA, 2018 WL
798731, at *1, *3 (D. Del. Feb. 9, 2018). Contra Kaplan v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P., No.
12-CV-9350 (VN) (KNF), 2015 WL 5730101, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015) (denying a motion to compel litigation-funding documents, finding the defendants did not demonstrate that
the documents were relevant).

126. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 131 F.R.D. 202, 204 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 1, 1990) (quoting Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1346, 1346 (5th Cir.
1978)). Accord Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (finding that parties to a civil
suit should "consistent with recognized privileges ... obtain the fullest possible knowledge
of the issues and facts before trial").
127. See Fridman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 185 So. 3d 1214, 1225 (Fla. 2016) ('Truly, this
is an appropriate example of the classic adage 'what is good for the goose is good for the
gander."'). Accord Fried v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 850 F.3d 590, 599 (3d Cir. 2017); Ariza
v. Loomis Armored US, LLC, No. 3:13-00419-JWD-EWD, 2016 WL 297702, at *1 n.2 (M.D.
La. Jan. 22, 2016); Lakah v. UBS AG, No. 07cv2799-MGC-FM, 2015 WL 13680552, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015); Kropf v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 14-CV-21599, 2014 WL
6682533, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2014); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Northrop Grumman Corp.,
No. 12 Civ. 3040(KBF), 2014 WL 464769, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014); Lopez v. Asmar's
Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 2011 WL 98573, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10,
2011); Younkin v. Blackwelder, No. 5D18-3548, 2019 WL 847548, at *1 (Fla. 5th DCA
Feb. 22, 2019).
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financiers to remain in the shadows and pull the strings of litigation,
impermissibly affecting the course of litigation and drawing out suits
unnecessarily.
This Note argued jurisdictions should adopt currently proposed
rules requiring disclosure of TPLF agreements. There are two main
reasons these rules should be adopted. First, doing so is more in line
with American fundamental notions of fairness and transparency.
Second, such disclosures will not affect compensatory damages
but may have an effect on punitive damages, especially if a TPLF
agreement exists due to personal animus of a financier against one
of the parties to a suit.
Although those not in favor of such disclosures argue that this
information is irrelevant, the interests favoring fairness and due
process outweigh their arguments. The American trial system is
premised on the idea that both parties must be on a level playing
field. And while this thought may seem a truism given the modern
realities of litigation, open and transparent disclosure of TPLF
agreements is one way to flatten this disparity and maintain fairness
for all. Sunlight is always preferable to the shadows.1 2 1

128. E.g., Charles Swain, Youth andAge, THE LITERARY GAZETTE, Mar. 16, 1850, at 205,
Column 1 ("The sun still face to face we meet-The shadow falls behind!") (emphasis in original).

